Der Weg in die Nullzins- und Hochverschuldungsfalle

Gunther Schnabl

Dezember 2013

Abstract

Das Papier zeigt den Ursache-Wirkungs-Zusammenhang zwischen expansiver Geldpolitik und Boom-und-Krisen-Zyklen auf Finanzmärkten einschließlich der Rückwirkungen auf die Finanzpolitik und Wachstumsperspektiven auf. Seit den 1990er Jahren reagierten die großen Zentralbanken mit Zinssenkungen auf Krisen in den Finanzmärkten. Die Liquiditätszufuhr in der Krise bewirkte erneute Spekulationsphasen, die beim Platzen der Blasen neue Zinssenkungen notwendig machten. Es wird gezeigt, dass die daraus resultierenden strukturellen Zinssenkungen gegen Null in den großen Industrieländern einen Anreiz zur Erhöhung der Staatsverschuldung gegeben haben. Hohe Staatsverschuldung wird als treibende Größe der Persistenz der Nullzinsfalle sowie für die Zerstörung der Allokations- und Signalfunktion von Zinsen identifiziert. Der Artikel zeigt am Beispiel Japan, wie die resultierende Niedrigzins- und Hochverschuldungsfalle die Wachstumsperspektiven eintrübt.

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Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

Uwe Vollmer; Harald Wiese

Dezember 2013

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.

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The Macroeconomic Policy Challenges of Balance Sheet Recession: Lessons from Japan for the European Crisis

Gunther Schnabl

Mai 2013

Abstract

The paper compares the boom-and-bust cycles in Japan and Europe with respect to the reasons for excessive booms, the characteristics of the crises, and the (potential) effects of the crisis therapies. As in Japan the consequence of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies is the hysteresis of the low-interest rate and high government debt environment, the erosion of the allocation and signaling function of the interest rate, the gradual quasi-nationalization of financial institutions as well as gradual real income losses, the economic policy implication for Japan and Europe is the timely exit from the current crisis therapies.

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Monetary Nationalism and International Economic Instability

Andreas Hoffmann; Gunther Schnabl

Februar 2013

Abstract

The paper describes the international transmission of boom-and-bust cycles to small periphery economies as the outcome of excessive liquidity supply in large center economies based on the credit cycle theories of Hayek, Mises and Minsky. We show how too expansionary monetary policies can cause overinvestment cycles and distortions in the economic structure on both a national and an international level. Feedback effects of crises in periphery on center countries trigger new rounds of monetary expansion in center countries, which bring about new international distortions. Crisis and contagion in globalized goods and financial markets indicate the limits of purely national monetary policies in countries which provide the asymmetric world monetary system with international currencies. This makes the case for a monetary policy in large countries that takes responsibility for its long-term effects on goods and financial markets in both the home and the foreign countries.

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Monetary Nationalism and International Economic Instability

Andreas Hoffmann; Gunther Schnabl

Februar 2013

Abstract

The paper describes the international transmission of boom-and-bust cycles to small periphery economies as the outcome of excessive liquidity supply in large center economies based on the credit cycle theories of Hayek, Mises and Minsky. We show how too expansionary monetary policies can cause overinvestment cycles and distortions in the economic structure on both a national and an international level. Feedback effects of crises in periphery on center countries trigger new rounds of monetary expansion in center countries, which bring about new international distortions. Crisis and contagion in globalized goods and financial markets indicate the limits of purely national monetary policies in countries which provide the asymmetric world monetary system with international currencies. This makes the case for a monetary policy in large countries that takes responsibility for its long-term effects on goods and financial markets in both the home and the foreign countries.

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Financial repression and debt liquidation in the USA and the euro area

Andreas Hoffmann; Holger Zemanek

Dezember 2012

Abstract

Rising debt levels have caused a revival of financial repression in the euro area and the USA. The Federal Reserve directly represses US bond yields and assists in financing the state budget, resulting in an overall liquidation effect from falling bond yields of about three per cent of total government revenues and one per cent of GDP in 2011. In the euro area, the ongoing actions to contain the European debt crisis have also repressed interest rates, easing debt-servicing costs in all European countries and reducing the interest rate payments for the German government by about one to two per cent of total government revenues. This article argues that a slight rise in infl ation could even liquidate German debt.

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The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Causes, Policy Reactions, and Obstacles to a Swift Solution

Uwe Vollmer

September 2012

Abstract

The paper describes the course of the European sovereign debt crisis and the policy reactions of the European Central Bank and European governments until summer 2012. We focus on policy trade-offs and conflicts of interests faced by authorities which made it difficult to coordinate a common policy reaction. In particular, we stress conflicting interests between member states of the Eurozone and nonmember countries. We also consider diverging interests between fiscal and monetary policy, between donating and receiving countries, and between legislative and executive powers within countries.

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Die japanischen Lehren für die europäische Krise

Gunther Schnabl

August 2012

Abstract

Japan hat nicht nur 15 Jahre vor Europa einen Boom-und-Krisen-Zyklus durchschritten, sondern auch wichtige Erfahrungen mit Krisentherapien in Form von monetärer Lockerung, expansiver Finanzpolitik und Rekapitalisierung von Finanzinstituten gemacht. Japan hat die Nullzinsgrenze bereits 1999 erreicht und eine Staatsverschuldung in Rekordhöhe angehäuft. Das Papier vergleicht die Boom-und-Krisen-Zyklen in Japan und Europa hinsichtlich der Ursachen, des Krisenverlaufs, der Krisentherapien und der Wirkung der Krisentherapien. Als Folgen einer auf expansiver Geld- und Finanzpolitik basierenden Krisentherapie werden die Hysterese der Niedrigzins- und Hochverschuldungsfalle, das Aussetzen der Allokations- und Signalfunktion des Zinses, die graduelle Verstaatlichung des Finanzsektors und der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage sowie graduelle reale Einkommensverluste abgeleitet. Die wirtschaftspolitische Implikation für Europa und Japan ist der konsequente Ausstieg aus der expansiven Geld- und Finanzpolitik trotz hoher Anpassungskosten.

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Emergency Liquidity Provision to Public Banks: Rules versus Discretion

Achim Hauck; Uwe Vollmer

April 2012

Abstract

This paper analyzes a government's incentives to provide fi nancial assistance to a public bank which is hit by a liquidity shock. We show that discretionary decisions about emergency liquidity assistance result in either excessively small or excessively large liquidity injections in a wide variety of circumstances. Also, adding a lender of last resort does not generally ensure a socially optimal policy. However, optimal rules exist that align the government's preferences with social preferences by either subsidizing or taxing liquidity aid.

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